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Abstract
Source representations play a role both in the formation of individual beliefs as well as in the
social transmission of such beliefs. Both of these functions suggest that source information
should be particularly useful in the context of interpersonal disagreement. Three experi-
ments with an identical design (one original study and two replications) with 3- to 4-year-old-
children (N = 100) assessed whether children’s source memory performance would improve
in the face of disagreement and whether such an effect interacts with different types of
sources (first- vs. second-hand). In a 2 x 2 repeated-measures design, children found out
about the contents of a container either by looking inside or being told (IV1). Then they were
questioned about the contents of the container by an interlocutor puppet who either agreed
or disagreed with their answer (IV2). We measured children’s source memory performance
in response to a free recall question (DV1) followed by a forced-choice question (DV2).
Four-year-olds (but not three-year-olds) performed better in response to the free recall
source memory question (but not the forced-choice question) when their interlocutor had
disagreed with them compared to when it had agreed with them. Children were also better
at recalling ‘having been told’ than ‘having seen’. These results demonstrate that by four
years of age, source memory capacities are sensitive to the communicative context of
assertions and serve social functions.
Introduction
The ability to ‘know how we know’—to know the sources of our beliefs—plays an important
role in belief formation and transmission. The source of a piece of information can have a dra-
matic impact on its cognitive effects in belief formation: people update their beliefs on the
basis of sources they view as reliable and tracking where a belief comes from allows people to
adjust their trust in the source if it turns out that the belief was false (e.g., [1, 2]). Apart from
playing a role in belief formation, knowing where our beliefs come from also influences how
we communicate those beliefs to others. Claims can be undermined if they are linked to an
inappropriate source (e.g., if someone asserts that it will rain tomorrow because they dreamt
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it), or bolstered if they are attributed to an authoritative source (e.g., if your doctor tells you
that you are sick; see [3]).
Thus, when children expect that source information will play an important communicative
role, they might be more likely to explicitly remember source information. In particular,
source information will be useful in interpersonal disagreement, as one can report sources in
an attempt to convince a disagreeing conversational partner (e.g., “I saw it”), or to mitigate the
disagreement by hedging one’s position (e.g., “someone told me”). In order to assess whether
preschoolers are sensitive to these social functions of source information, we studied whether
disagreement facilitates the explicit retrieval of source information.
Before introducing our experimental design, we offer a short overview of the cognitive
requirements of source representation and how these capacities might be brought to bear in
communication.
The cognitive requirements of explicit source memory
In spite of its apparent simplicity, the capacity to report the sources of our beliefs is cognitively
demanding. Consider the simplest and most common sources people attribute their beliefs to,
such as perception, hearsay, and inference. If you form the belief that it is going to rain tomor-
row after watching a weather report, did you form the belief based on perception of the map,
hearsay from the presenter, or inference from this information? Competently retrieving source
information is particularly challenging because it is often not obvious what the appropriate
source is in a given context and different sources can have different cognitive and conversa-
tional consequences (e.g. [4–6]).
Partly as a result of the difficulty in attributing sources to our beliefs, people seem to leave
most of their beliefs without source tags when they are acquired [7]. Even when sources are
taken into account in belief formation (people tend to update their beliefs on the basis of
sources they view as reliable), they are not always tagged to beliefs as sources [8, 9]. Instead,
source tagging is often performed a posteriori. To do so, dedicated source monitoring mecha-
nisms infer sources from memories of learning events and other information [10], such as
assumptions about what sources are appropriate for what beliefs (for example, that “feeling”
can’t be the source of knowing the color of an object [11]).
Source recall is thus a cognitively sophisticated and demanding ability. Consequently, chil-
dren start developing the capacity to accurately report the sources of their beliefs relatively late
(between three and five years of age, see [12–14]) compared to other social skills such as mind-
reading (e.g., [15–17]). Why are source representations important enough to warrant this cog-
nitive complexity?
The cognitive functions of explicit source memory
Source representation might serve several functions, which can be broadly classified into two
categories: individual and social functions [1]. As mentioned above, source representation
might enhance individual cognition by allowing people to appropriately update their beliefs.
By comparing the sources of beliefs held in memory and of novel pieces of information—in
particular communicated information (see [2, 18])—people might make better decisions about
how to weigh these beliefs and when to revise them. Directly or not, it is chiefly this individual
function that has been the focus of the developmental literature on source memory (e.g., [13,
19, 20]).
For example, Whitcombe and Robinson (2000) [21] as well as Robinson and Whitcombe
(2003) [22] investigated whether 3- to 5-year-old children would accept a contradiction from
an experimenter who was either better or less well informed than themselves. They tested
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whether children’s ability to accurately remember the source of their own belief would help
them make the right decision about what to believe when the experimenter contradicted them.
The results suggested that children were sensitive to how well informed a speaker was relative
to themselves in their belief updating decisions. For instance, in Whitcombe and Robinson’s
tunnel game studies, the participants had to identify which one of a pair of toys differing either
in color or in hardness, was hidden in a tunnel. The children and an experimenter sometimes
saw the hidden toy, or they felt it. Children who had only uninformative access (e.g., felt a toy
identified by color) were more likely to defer to an experimenter’s claim about the toy’s iden-
tity when the latter had informative access (saw the toy), than when she did not (felt it). How-
ever, the results did not reveal a strong link between source representation and belief revision:
many children were able to update their beliefs appropriately without being able to accurately
remember the source of their own beliefs.
Related evidence comes from a large literature investigating how children learn from testi-
mony. Preschoolers have been shown to have sophisticated capacities for tracking the trustwor-
thiness and competence of informants and to use such information for assessing the reliability
of assertions in belief formation [23–25]; for recent reviews see [26, 27]. While explicit source
memory has not been the focus of studies investigating how children learn from testimony,
these topics are closely related. Studies of children’s capacities to evaluate the reliability of speak-
ers, for example, suggest that children track where information comes from for long enough to
revise trust when a statement turns out to be inaccurate. Moreover, toddlers and preschoolers
have been shown to not only monitor the reliability of speakers but to also appropriately revise
their beliefs when new information about the speaker’s reliability is revealed [28–30]. We term
these functions ‘individual’ because they mainly concern the way a given individual manages
their beliefs in the face of new information. In other words, these uses of source memory come
into play mainly on the receiver’s side of informational exchanges.
Besides these individual functions, however, source information also has important social
functions; that is, functions concerning the ‘sender’s side’ in the exchange of beliefs between
individuals. Being able to remember the sources of their beliefs allows people to communicate
these sources to others, thereby serving a variety of goals: one can use sources to convince (“I
saw it with my own eyes”), to gain credit (“I found the solution on my own”), or on the con-
trary, to hedge one’s statements (“It’s only something I’ve heard”) (for a more general argu-
ment regarding the social functions of episodic memory, see [31]; see also [32–35]). For
example, Köymen & Tomasello (2018) [36] have shown that 7-year-olds (and to some extent
5-year-olds) already use source information productively as justifications in the context of col-
laborative decision making. The importance of the social functions of source representation is
also suggested by the fact that over one-quarter of the world’s languages employ obligatory
grammatical markers, known as evidentials, specifying the source of the speaker’s assertion
[37, 38 gives an estimate of over 50% of the world’s languages]. Even languages that do not
encode evidentiality grammatically possess numerous ways of communicating the sources of a
speaker’s beliefs [39].
Moreover, there are reasons to believe that children’s ability to use source information for
social ends is closely related to the development of source memory. Although learning a lan-
guage with evidentials does not seem to improve children’s source memory capacities [5] chil-
dren’s production of accurate evidentials (arguably serving a social function of source
memory) develops in parallel with their source memory [40]. Moreover, the production of
accurate evidentials precedes children’s full comprehension of similar expressions (the latter
arguably serving a more individual function of source memory) [41].
How does source information contribute to communicative exchanges? First, source infor-
mation helps audiences calibrate their trust in whatever the speaker is asserting (e.g. [42]). By
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communicating their source, speakers leave it up to their audience to weigh the evidence
according to their own estimate of the source’s credibility. Second, source claims are relevant
to assess who is accountable for the validity of the communicated information. By claiming to
have first-hand evidence, speakers make themselves directly accountable, while referring to a
second-hand source allows speakers to defer such responsibility to someone else (see, e.g., [33,
43]). The capacity to know the source of one’s belief is therefore not only important to enable
efficient belief revision: explicit source memory also plays a crucial role in helping speakers
effectively communicate their beliefs to others.
Disagreement and the social functions of source memory
In light of the above discussion, disagreement should facilitate both individual and social func-
tions of source memory retrieval. First, disagreement might signal that the belief in question is
less reliable than one might have thought otherwise. This might prompt a search for how the
belief was initially acquired. Second, however, disagreement signals that the belief in question
requires justification and this in turn might prompt the listener to search for source information
in order to provide such justification. Moreover, a speaker might exert more scrutiny of a justifi-
cation provided if the justification request follows a disagreement. As a result, a disagreement
should lead people to not just search for justifications of the contested assertion but more specif-
ically for accurate justifications. If source memory serves social functions, when facing disagree-
ment speakers might thus be prompted to spend more cognitive resources on retrieving and
reporting their source accurately than in other conversational contexts. Note that both of these
effects bear on the retrieval rather than encoding stage of belief formation. While it is the case
that, under some circumstances, source information is encoded when a given belief is formed
(see e.g. [9]), disagreement cannot always be anticipated at belief formation.
Existing evidence shows that preschoolers are sensitive to some features of disagreement:
4-year-olds have been shown to detect when someone contradicts them [44], and to adjust their
communication to convince an interlocutor who keeps disagreeing [45]. Given that the pre-
school years are crucial in the development of source memory [13], and that children of this age
appear to be able to react appropriately to disagreement, they provide the most relevant age at
which to test our hypothesis, namely, that source memory performance will be facilitated in a
context of interpersonal disagreement, compared to a context of interpersonal agreement.
The present study
In the current study, the children were made aware of the contents of a container either by
looking inside the container themselves, or by being told what the contents were by the experi-
menter. The children then met an interlocutor (a puppet) who asked them about those con-
tents. Once the child had said what they believed was in the container, the puppet either
agreed or disagreed with the child’s answer. Finally, the puppet asked an open (“How do you
know”?) followed by a closed (“Did you see it or did someone tell you?”) source memory ques-
tion. We conducted three separate experiments with the same design: the original study (with
4-year-olds), a replication with the same age group, and a replication with younger children
(3-year-olds).
While Whitcombe and Robinson (2000) [21] and Robinson and Whitcombe (2003) [22]
investigated whether children would appropriately revise their own belief in the face of a con-
tradiction by an interlocutor, they did not test the effects of this contradiction on source mem-
ory performance. Moreover, in contrast to previous studies, in our paradigm, the source
memory question was not asked by the experimenter but by the interlocutor puppet who was
engaged in a game with the child. This difference is important because children might
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interpret questions asked by a ‘third party’ experimenter as test questions [46], rather than as a
natural request for justification which was our target here. While test questions assume that
the speaker herself already knows the answer, requests for justification can be interpreted as a
speaker’s genuine requests for more information that could potentially change their minds.
Our central prediction bore on the effect of agreement: We predicted that disagreement
would facilitate source memory performance, making children more likely to recall the source
of their beliefs when their interlocutor disagreed with them compared to when the interlocutor
agreed with them.
Methods
We conducted three experiments: Experiment 1 constituted the original study with 4-year-old
children. Its results tended to confirm our hypothesis about the effect of agreement on source
memory, by showing marginally significant statistical trends in the expected direction (see
below). Thus, in order to confirm our results, we ran Experiment 2, which was a pre-registered
replication of Experiment 1. Experiment 3 was designed to test the ontogeny of the behaviors
observed in Experiments 1 and 2. It used the same procedure as Experiments 1 and 2 with a
younger age group (3-year-olds). Since the three experiments were identical in terms of proce-
dure and design, we report their methods and results together. All experiments were carried
out in the same environment, and Experiments 2 and 3 were performed after Experiment 1.
Moreover, Experiments 2 and 3 were carried out by different experimenters than Experiment
1. Given that this study was carried out in Hungarian, it bears mentioning that Hungarian
does not have evidential markers.
Participants
For Experiment 1, we recruited 34 4-year-old children. Two of these children had to be
excluded because of experimenter error (see Coding and Analyses), so that the final sample
included 32 children (age range: 48–59 months-old; mean age: 54 months; 16 females). We
chose this number of participants so as to ensure that at least four children completed each
counterbalancing order (see Design).
In Experiments 2 and 3, we aimed for a sample size superior or equal to that of the original
study for each age group. We had a pre-registered stopping rule of 40 participants for each of
our experiments which we exceeded due to a scheduling miscommunication between the
research assistants running the study. Thus, we recruited 42 4-year-olds for Experiment 2 and
43 3-year-olds for Experiment 3. Children were excluded from analysis if they contributed
fewer than four valid trials (Experiment 1: 0 children; Experiment 2: 6 children; Experiment 3:
6 children). Further, we had to exclude 2 children from Experiment 2 due to technical difficul-
ties and 1 child from Experiment 3 for not fulfilling the age criterion.
Thus, Experiment 2’s final sample included 34 4-year-olds (age range: 48–59 months-old;
mean age: 56; 18 females) and Experiment 3’s final sample included 34 3-year-olds (age range:
36–47 months-old; mean age: 43; 11 females).
All of our participants were recruited at the local Zoo in Budapest (Hungary) during visit-
ing hours. The procedure and informed consent forms were reviewed and approved by the
Hungarian United Ethical Review Committee for Research in Psychology.
Design
All three experiments employed the same within-subjects design with two two-level indepen-
dent variables: Agreement (interlocutors agrees/interlocutor disagrees) and Source (seeing/
being told). Participants completed three familiarization trials and six test trials, which exposed
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them to each combination of factors at least once. Since piloting revealed that increasing the
trial number to eight test trials caused children to lose focus in the last two trials, we chose to
expose children to six test trials in order to maximize the amount of data points we could col-
lect per participant. Even though this resulted in an unbalanced design on the participant level,
all cells of our design received an equal number of observations across children.
The order in which Agreement and Source factors varied was counterbalanced within as
well as across participants, and so was the order of sources mentioned in the closed source
memory question. Moreover, whether children received an ‘agreement’ or ‘disagreement’ and
a ‘seen’ or ‘told’ trial first was counterbalanced across children. All in all, we employed eight
counterbalancing orders, aiming for a minimum of four participants per order in each group
(for the full counterbalancing information see Tables 1 and 2 in S1 File).
Each child was asked three test questions per test trial: a contents question about the con-
tents of the container, an open source memory question ("how do you know that there is a
[. . .] inside ?"), and a closed source memory question ("did you see or were you told that there
is a [. . .] inside?"). We included both an open and a closed test question in order to have two
separate measures of children’s source memory. While the open source question was intended
to assess children’s source memory through free recall, the closed source question was
intended to serve as a recognition memory test for source.
Procedure
Before the start of the experiment, the children were asked if they wanted to participate in a
game and only participated in case both they and their parents agreed to do so (parents
received and signed an informed consent form). Children were seated on a chair at a table
which was placed in front of a curtain. A first experimenter sat next to the table, while a second
experimenter was hidden behind the curtain controlling a puppet (“Zirmi” the cat) serving as
the interlocutor for the child. Caregivers were allowed to stay in the room but were asked not
to interfere with the procedure in any way. The whole procedure was video recorded. Detailed
scripts for the familiarization and test procedures can be found in S2 File.
Familiarization trials. Children completed three familiarization trials introducing them
to the setting of the task, their interlocutor (‘Zirmi the cat’), the different sources (finding out
about the contents of a box either by looking inside or by being told), and the fact that Zirmi
sometimes disagrees without necessarily being correct.
In the first familiarization trial, children were introduced to Zirmi and asked if they wanted
to play a game in which they have to find out what was inside a box placed on the table in front
of them. Next, Zirmi opened the box and showed its contents to the child.
In the second familiarization trial, the experimenter removed the box from view and placed
a new object inside it. The experimenter then asked the child whether they wanted to have a
look inside and tell them what was in the box. The children were then allowed to look into the
Table 1. Results of non-parametric analysis for Experiments 1, 2 (4-year-olds), and 3 (3-year-olds).
Experiment Open Source Question Closed Source Question
Sources Mentioned Accuracy Accuracy
Agreement Source Agreement Source Agreement Source
Z p Z p Z p Z p Z p Z p
Experiment 1 0.47 .635 0.17 .86 1.92 .055 1.63 .102 0.77 .440 0.49 .622
Experiment 2 0.18 .851 0.486 .627 2.2 .028 2.84 .004 0.50 .613 2.37 .018
Experiment 3 0.16 .873 0.14 .891 1.59 .111 1.84 .065 0.48 .627 1.11 .268
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0249958.t001
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box and answered the question. If the child gave an incorrect answer, the experimenter cor-
rected them. After the child gave the correct answer, the experimenter asked the child the
open source question (“How did you find out what was inside?”) and corrected them if they
gave the wrong answer. Here, any reference to visual perception was deemed as a correct
answer. Next, the experimenter turned away and Zirmi appeared from behind the curtain.
Zirmi asked the child about what was inside before disagreeing with the child and suggesting a
different, wrong answer. Finally, the child and Zirmi opened the box together to find out that
the child had been correct about its contents.
The third and last familiarization trial was similar in structure to the second one. However,
in this trial the experimenter told the child about the contents of the box and Zirmi agreed
with the child about the contents. Here, in response to the open source question any reference
to the experimenter or to testimony was treated as a correct answer.
Test trials. At the beginning of each test trial, only the first experimenter and the partici-
pant interacted, and the puppet (“Zirmi,” controlled by a second experimenter) was not pres-
ent. The experimenter removed the object from the last trial from the box, in full view of the
child. Next, she hid a new object inside the box underneath the table, so that the hiding (but
not the object itself) was visible to the child. In each trial, a different object was hidden inside
the container. Which object was hidden in each trial stayed consistent across children. Next,
the experimenter asked the child if they wanted to know what was inside the box by saying:
“Look, I put something new inside! Do you want to know what it is?”. The rest of the procedure
varied depending on condition.
In the ‘told’ condition, the experimenter told the participant what object she had hidden by
saying: “I will tell you! It’s a [name of the object hidden inside the box, e.g., a car]! There is a [name
of the object hidden inside the box, e.g., a car] inside this box!”. Next, the experimenter asked:
“What’s inside? Can you tell me?”. In case the child did not give the correct answer, the experi-
menter told her again what was inside the box until the participant gave the correct answer.
In the ‘seen’ condition, the experimenter allowed the child to look inside the box. She said:
“Do you want to look inside to find out what’s inside?”. Next, she let the child open the box and
Table 2. Results of likelihood ratio test-based model comparison for children’s performance in Experiments 1, 2, and 3.
Dependent Variable Model Df χ2 p 95% CI
Open Source Question: Sources Mentioned Trial Number 1 46.49 < .0001 0.44–0.88
Age in months 1 32.36 < .0001 1.49–3.56
Agreement (agreed/disagreed) 1 0.001 .974 -0.62–0.6
Source (seen/told) 1 0.30 .583 -0.43–0.77
Open Source Question: Accuracy Trial Number 1 14.96 < .001 0.13–0.41
Age in months 1 16.42 < .0001 0.53–1.59
Agreement (agreed/disagreed) 1 2.04 .153 -0.13–0.80
Source (seen/told) 1 28.36 < .0001 -1.75 –-0.78
Age�Agreement 1 5.67 .017 0.11–1.11
Closed Source Question: Accuracy Trial Number 1 4.79 .029 0.01–0.26
Age in months 1 24.17 < .0001 0.46–1.06
Agreement (agreed/disagreed) 1 0.51 .477 -0.57–0.26
Source (seen/told) 1 14.22 < .001 -1.23 –-0.38
‘�’ denotes an interaction term in the model. The interaction between Age and Agreement on children’s performance in the open source question was the only
significant interaction effect we found. All other, non-significant interaction terms were dropped from the model in order to interpret main effects. Significant effects at
the .05 level are printed in bold.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0249958.t002
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look inside it, before asking: “Did you see what’s inside? Can you tell me?”. If the child answered
correctly, the experimenter said: “Wow! That’s exciting!”. In case the child did not give the cor-
rect answer, the experimenter asked her to look inside again until the participant gave the cor-
rect answer.
Next, in all conditions, the experimenter turned away and Zirmi appeared from behind the
curtain. The puppet asked the child what was inside the box by saying: “Hello! Oh! There is the
box again. . . What do you think is inside?” (‘contents question’). Zirmi repeated the contents
question until the child gave an answer. After the child had answered, Zirmi’s reaction differed
across conditions. In the ‘agreement’ condition, Zirmi agreed by saying: “You are right! There
must be a [name of the object that she child said to be inside the box, e.g., a car] inside.” In the
‘disagreement’ condition, Zirmi disagreed by saying: “No! I don’t think there is an [name of the
object that she child said to be inside the box, e.g., a car] inside! I think there is a [name of an
alternative object, e.g., a watch] inside!”. In each disagreement trial, Zirmi suggested a different
alternative object. The alternative object Zirmi suggested to the child when disagreeing was
predetermined for each trial and stayed consistent across children.
In all conditions, after either agreeing or disagreeing with the child, Zirmi asked the child
the open source question (“How do you know that there is a [name of the object that she child
said to be inside the box, e.g., a car] inside?”). If the child did not answer, Zirmi repeated this
question once. If the child still did not answer, the trial was coded as an incorrect answer (see
below). Regardless of the child’s answer to the open source question, Zirmi then asked the
child the closed source question (“Did you see or were you told that there is a [name of the object
that she child said to be inside the box, e.g., a car] inside?”). The order in which sources were
mentioned in the closed source question was counterbalanced across trials within subjects.
Again, if the child did not answer the closed question, Zirmi repeated the question once. In the
disagreement condition, irrespective of the child’s answer, Zirmi responded: “Hm‥ if you
[saw/were told] then you must be right. . . there must be an [name of the object that she child
said to be inside the box, e.g., a car] inside”.
Next, in all conditions, Zirmi and the child opened the box together to check its contents.
Finally, Zirmi said: “Oh! I have to go. . .!” and went away behind the curtains. Participants then
proceeded to the next test trial, till the end of the experiment.
Coding. Responses were double-coded by coders unfamiliar with the hypotheses of the
study. Disagreements between the two primary coders were resolved by a third coder (the first
author; Cohen’s kappa across all studies and measures was .833).
A first preliminary coding served to exclude participants and trials for which the experi-
mental protocol had not been followed correctly, or if parents had interfered in a relevant way
in the procedure. For the remaining participants/trials, the children’s answers were transcribed
by two different coders unfamiliar with the hypotheses of the study. Children’s answers to
three test questions were coded: (1) the contents question, (2) the open source question, (3)
the closed sources question.
Responses to the contents question were coded as correct when they mentioned what was
inside the container or when they referred to objects looking closely similar to the actual
objects inside the container (e.g., “a bus” for a tram car).
Responses to the open source question were coded for two measures. First, we generated a
binary variable coding for whether children mentioned a source (irrespective of correctness)
in response to the open source question (0 = no source mentioned; 1 = source mentioned).
Second, we created a binary variable coding for whether children referred to the correct source
in a given trial (0 = incorrect response; 1 = correct response). The first measure quantified the
children’s willingness to provide a relevant response, while the second measure quantified the
accuracy of this response. Coders were instructed to code any reference to visual perception
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(e.g., “I looked”, “I peeked” etc.) in response to the question as a reference to having seen the
contents of the container. Conversely, any reference to the experimenter (such as pointing or
addressing her) or to testimony (e.g., “someone told me”) was coded as a reference to having
been told about the contents of the container. Finally, a lack of response after the question had
been repeated once, an answer not referring to either perception, the experimenter, or testi-
mony (such as “I just know”), as well as professions of ignorance (such as “I don’t know”),
were coded as incorrect answers.
Responses to the closed source question were coded in a similar way as the responses to the
open source question. However, for this test question, we did not code separately whether chil-
dren mentioned a source but only whether their response was correct.
Responses of children in the final sample were excluded from analysis if the experimenter
failed to repeat the question in case the child had not given a response to the initial query
(Experiment 1: 6 responses; Experiment 2: 11 responses; Experiment 3: 14 responses).
A trial would also have been excluded from analysis if the children had not answered the
contents question correctly. Since all children in all trials were able to provide a correct
response to the contents question, no trials had to be excluded in this way. Trials were also
excluded when either experimenter significantly departed from the experimental protocol,
when the child did not cooperate, or when a caregiver interfered with the procedure—e.g., by
giving hints to the child (Experiment 1: 2 trials; Experiment 2: 0 trials; Experiment 3: 2 trials).




For a summary of the descriptive results for Experiments 1, 2, and 3, see Tables 1 and 2 in S3
File. As preregistered, we first carried out non-parametric analyses based on Wilcoxon Signed-
Rank tests (see Table 1 for detailed statistics). These analyses were carried out on the propor-
tions of answers in a given condition. All reported within-subject statistical comparisons were
performed by two-tailed Wilcoxon Signed Ranks tests.
Number of sources mentioned. On average, children mentioned a source in response to
the open source memory question (“How do you know that. . .?”) in 82.45% (SD = 24.87) of
trials in Experiment 1, in 79.46% (SD = 32.24) of trials in Experiment 2, and in 40.69%
(SD = 41.13) of trials in Experiment 3. In each of our experiments, there was no effect of
Agreement or of Source on how many sources children mentioned in response to the open
source memory question (all ps > .626, see Table 1). That is, across all three experiments, chil-
dren mentioned a roughly equal number of sources in the agreement and the disagreement
conditions as well as in the ‘seen’ and ‘told’ conditions.
Performance in the open source memory question. On average, children answered the
open source memory question correctly in 64.11% (SD = 31.07) of trials in Experiment 1, in
60.78% (SD = 33.15) of trials in Experiment 2, and in 28% (SD = 31.59) of trials in Experiment
3. Importantly, we found a marginally significant effect of Agreement on children’s responses
to the open source question in Experiment 1 (p = .055), and a significant effect in Experiment
2 (p = .028; see Fig 1). We computed the combined probability for these two independent stud-
ies using the weighted Z-method [47]—weighting each study by its sample size. This analysis
yielded a significant result (p = .005). This suggests that 4-year-old children in Experiment 2
(MDisagreed = 0.66, SDDisagreed = 0.48; MAgreed = 0.56, SDAgreed = 0.5), and to some extent in
Experiment 1 (MDisagreed = 0.69, SDDisagreed = 0.46; MAgreed = 0.59, SDAgreed = 0.49), tended to
perform better at recalling how they came to know about the contents of the container in the
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disagreement compared to the agreement condition. In contrast, 3-year-old children (Experi-
ment 3) performed roughly equally in responding to the open source question when the pup-
pet had disagreed (MDisagreed = 0.27, SDDisagreed = 0.45) and agreed with them (MAgreed = 0.32,
SDAgreed = 0.47; p = .111).
Further, Source had a significant effect on children’s performance in the open source mem-
ory question in Experiment 2 (MTold = 0.72, SDTold = 0.45; MSeen = 0.50, SDSeen = 0.50, p =
.004) and Experiment 3 (MTold = 0.38, SDTold = 0.41; MSeen = 0.21, SDSeen = 0.49, p = .065)
such that children tended to perform better at recalling the correct source when they had been
told about the contents of the container than when they had seen them.
Performance in the closed source memory question. On average, children answered the
closed source memory question (“Did you see or were you told that. . .?”) correctly in 79.9%
(SD = 21.24) of trials in Experiment 1, in 78.92% (SD = 20.79) of trials in Experiment 2, and in
52.79% (SD = 29.28) of trials in Experiment 3. Similarly to the open source question, children
in Experiment 2 performed better at answering the closed source question when they had been
told about the contents of the container (MTold = 0.89, SDTold = 0.31) compared to when they
had seen them (MSeen = 0.7, SDSeen = 0.46, p = .018). Source and Agreement had no other effect
on performance in the closed source memory question in any of the three experiments (all ps
> .267, see Table 1).
Mixed-effects analysis
To explicitly take into account repeated-measures, we entered the data of all three experiments
(N = 100) into separate logistic linear mixed-effects models with a binomial distribution (logit
link) for each of our dependent measures. That is, even though we report the results of these
models together below, we ran three separate mixed-effect models, one for each of the follow-
ing: (1) whether participants mentioned a source in response to the open source question, (2)
whether participants provided the correct source in response to the open source question, and
(3) whether participants answered the closed source question correctly.
This analysis allowed us to ask two questions. First, whether the effect of Agreement on
children’s performance in the open source memory question increased with age. In other
words, we looked for evidence that–with increasing age–children’s performance in the open
Fig 1. Results of the non-parametric analysis for the effect of agreement on children’s performance in the open
source memory question. Box-plot middle lines depict means; scatter plots depict individual participant’s jittered
proportions of correct responses. Experiments 1 and 2 were conducted with 4-year-olds, Experiment 3 with 3-year-
olds.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0249958.g001
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source memory question became increasingly sensitive to whether their interlocutor had
agreed or disagreed with them. If the effect of agreement on children’s source memory perfor-
mance depended on age, we would expect to find a significant interaction effect between Age
and Agreement here. Second, this analysis enabled us to test for interaction effects between the
Source and Agreement factors. After all, it might be the case that the effect of disagreement
depended on what source the interlocutor purported to have or vice versa.
We added random intercepts for each participant with fixed slopes as well as fixed effects
for Age (in months), Agreement (agreed/disagreed), Source (seen/told), Trial Number (to con-
trol for order effects), Agreement x Source, Age x Agreement, and Age x Source. By-participant
slopes for the various effects were not included because models including such slopes resulted
in a singular fit. P-values were obtained by likelihood ratio tests (LRTs) of the full model with
the effect in question against the model without the effect in question. For the estimates of the
model parameters, the 95% confidence intervals were assessed by computing a likelihood pro-
file and finding the appropriate cutoffs based on the LRT. Non-significant interaction effects
were dropped from the model to interpret main effects. To assess main effects in the presence
of a higher-order interaction (as was the case for the effects of Age and Agreement for chil-
dren’s accuracy in the open source question), an LRT was conducted between models differing
only in the presence or absence of the fixed main effect. Statistics were computed using R 3.6.2
(R Core Team, 2019) with the lme4 package (v1.1–21; [48]). The results of this analysis are
summarized in Table 2.
Order and age effects. We found significant effects of Trial Number for all of our mea-
sures. This suggests that there were trial order effects in how many sources children mentioned
in the open source question, as well as how often children were correct in responding to both
the open and closed source questions.
However, in spite of these order effects, our mixed-effects analysis showed a main effect of
Age for all measures: with increasing age, children mentioned more sources, and were more
likely to correctly answer the open source memory question, as well as the closed source mem-
ory question.
Agreement effects. Crucially, we did not find main effects of Agreement, observing
instead a significant interaction effect between Age and Agreement on performance in the
open source memory question (see Fig 2). This suggests that, across all the experiments (and
in spite of the order effects mentioned above), with increasing age children performed better
in answering the open source question in the face of disagreement compared to agreement.
Source effects. We found a main effect of Source on performance both in the open and
the closed source memory questions such that, independently of their age, children were more
likely to provide the correct source when they had been told about the contents of the con-
tainer. We did not find any interaction effects between Source and Agreement on any of our
measures suggesting that the effect of Source did not depend on whether the interlocutor had
agreed with the child.
Discussion
The effect of agreement
In the present study, 3- and 4-year-old children were asked by a puppet how they knew about
the contents of a box, which they had either seen or been told about. The results of Experi-
ments 1 and 2 indicate that 4-year-old children performed better in answering an open-ended
source question when the puppet had disagreed rather than agreed with them about the con-
tents of the box. In contrast, 3-year-old children in Experiment 3 did not show this effect.
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Taken together Experiments 1 and 2 provided evidence for four-year-old children’s ten-
dency to report sources more accurately when their interlocutor disagreed with them. None-
theless, the current study had limitations that might explain why we did not observe a stronger
effect of disagreement on children’s responses. Most importantly, children engaged in a ‘game’
with a puppet rather than in a ‘real-world’ interaction with more important communicative
stakes. Furthermore, our agreement/disagreement manipulation was relatively subtle in so far
as the only relevant difference between these conditions was one sentence spoken by the inter-
locutor puppet.
Another limitation is that our results do not reveal whether the effect of Agreement on
4-year-olds’ source memory is due to (i) an increase in performance in the disagreement con-
dition, (ii) a decrease in performance in the agreement condition, or (iii) a combination of
these two factors. In spite of these limitations and regardless of the respective effects of agree-
ment and disagreement, our results nonetheless indicate that source memory performance
was comparatively enhanced when children needed to justify their claims (in the disagreement
condition) compared to when they did not (in the agreement condition), thus supporting the
view that source memory can serve a social function in childhood.
As mentioned above, both the individual and social functions of source monitoring should
be more strongly activated in the context of interpersonal disagreement. As a result, source
memory performance should improve in such a context. However, the effect of Agreement on
4-year-olds’ source memory performance can be explained by a number of non-mutually
exclusive mechanisms. First, disagreement (more so than agreement) might have caused chil-
dren to doubt the truth of their own assertions thereby prompting them to search for internal
justification.
Second, the interlocutor’s disagreement might have made it easier than agreement for chil-
dren to understand what kind of response would be appropriate to the open source memory
question via cueing children to interpret the question as a request for justification. As a conse-
quence, in the context of disagreement, the open source question might have been interpreted
as a retrieval cue for the events at the beginning of the trial (when children had found out
Fig 2. Relationship between age (in months) and agreement across all three experiments (N = 100). Scatter plots
depict individual participants’ jittered performance (proportion correct) in the agreement and disagreement
conditions. Regression lines depict the results of linear logistic regression for the effect of age on performance in the
two Agreement conditions.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0249958.g002
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about the contents of the container). Thus, it might have been easier for children to think of
the event during which they found out about the contents of the container as a source of their
belief [8]. In contrast, it might have been pragmatically less clear to children how to interpret
the open source question in the context of agreement (for example, it might have been per-
ceived as a ‘test question,’ [46]). On this interpretation, our results suggest that 4-year-olds
understand the justificatory function of source information.
Third, agreement might have impacted children’s motivation to either convince their inter-
locutor or hedge their bets about their own claim. Children might have been prompted to be
more careful in answering correctly to a disagreeing (i.e., epistemically vigilant) interlocutor
than to an agreeing one. As a result, the participants might have spent more cognitive
resources on recovering the exact source of their belief about the contents of the box in the
context of disagreement. In other words, children had stronger incentives to calibrate their
commitment correctly when facing a disagreeing rather than an agreeing interlocutor. The
fact that children made more source errors in the agreement than the disagreement condition
despite the fact that they did not mention fewer sources, lends support to this interpretation.
Note that this latter interpretation of the results attributes a higher degree of communica-
tive competence to children. The 4-year-old children in Experiments 1 & 2 would not only
have to have understood that questions in the context of disagreement can be interpreted as
requests for justification and that sources can provide such justification: they would also have
to have understood that sources can serve the more specific function of modulating speaker
commitment.
It is also worth noting that, since in any given trial the children did not know whether their
interlocutor would agree or disagree with them, the effect of Agreement on 4-year-olds’ per-
formance has to be attributed to the retrieval, and not to the encoding, of source information.
One might think that our data could be explained by the fact that children might have come to
expect to encounter disagreement in subsequent trials after the first ‘disagreement trial,’ and
encoded source information more deeply as a result. Such a generalized expectation should,
however, have resulted in increased performance across trials, and not only in disagreement
trials. Moreover, since we controlled for the effect of Trial Number in our models, it is unlikely
that the effect we observed was driven by children who received a disagreement trial first or by
inter-trial carry-over effects of another sort. Moreover, an effect driven by the retrieval phase is
to be expected under the assumption that source monitoring processes specifically occur at
retrieval and operate over episodic representations [10]. In short, regardless of the exact mech-
anisms leading to the effect of disagreement on source recall, the present results therefore sup-
port the idea that retrieval of source information is sensitive to communicative context by four
years of age [31].
We make no strong claims about why Agreement had no effect on the performance of
three-year-olds. Their insensitivity to Agreement in our task can be explained by a variety of
factors, including a reduced sensitivity to disagreement, weak source memory capacities, or
linguistic difficulties. Yet, the effect of communicative context on source memory performance
observed here might contribute to our understanding of the underlying reasons for the com-
mon finding that source memory performance significantly increases between three and five
years of age. In the present study, older children did not only perform better but also became
sensitive to agreement with their interlocutor in their responses to the open source memory
question.
The improvement in source memory performance between three and five years is often
attributed to children’s developing theory-of-mind abilities (e.g., [13, 49, 50]). However, while
it is possible that source memory performance increases as a function of proficiency in mental
state reasoning, another contributing factor might be that children’s increasing source
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memory performance is related to their developing communicative competence. In particular,
it has been shown that children develop a range of important communicative capacities related
to epistemic vigilance during this time (e.g., [23]). Similarly, we observed an increased effect of
disagreement on children’s source memory performance as they got older. Importantly, this
effect of disagreement cannot be explained merely as a result of a generalized increased profi-
ciency in source memory with age (since the effect is specific to the disagreement condition).
Instead, it could be the result of the maturation of communicative competence (e.g., an
increased understanding that disagreement implies a request for justification). Our results
thus add to this prior work by suggesting that 4-year-olds might be sensitive to the communi-
cative function of knowing the source of their own beliefs as providing a potential justification
of their assertions to their interlocutor.
The effect of source
In both age groups, the children were more likely to accurately report that they had been told
something than that they had seen something. Although we did not predict this result, it
deserves discussion given that it contrasts with other findings suggesting that children have a
tendency to over-attribute their own beliefs to perception rather than testimony or inference.
In particular, Whitcombe and Robinson (2000) [21], as well as Robinson and Whitcombe
(2003) [22], found a trend opposite to that of the present study: in their studies, children of the
same age group seemed to be biased to over-report first-hand over second-hand sources of
information (for similar results with adults, see [51]).
In our view, this result can be explained in several ways. On the one hand, differences in the
way the information was presented between different source conditions in the present study
might have made it easier for the children in our experiment to encode that they had been told
the answer, or more difficult to encode that they had seen the contents of the container. In par-
ticular, ‘seeing’ something may not have been encoded as a unique event while the interlocu-
tor’s communicative act might have made event boundaries easier to differentiate. However,
the differences between the protocols of the current and of past studies in this respect were not
large, and so it is not clear why such differences at encoding would emerge.
On the other hand, this effect could have been due to a response bias towards answering hav-
ing been told, independently of the actual source. That is, children might have been better at
reporting having been told because they were choosing this answer more often overall and not
because they were actually better at remembering having been told. One reason for such a
response bias in the present study might be that the children either wanted to hedge their bets or
increase their authority by referring to the experimenter as a source. This possibility is supported
by results suggesting that preschool children generally view testimony as highly trustworthy [52,
53]. In the current context, results such as those by Jaswal and colleagues suggest that children
perceived the adult informant as authoritative, and might therefore have judged it as ‘safer’ to
refer to testimony when asked for their source. The main difference between our current design
and previous studies such as those by Whitcombe and Robinson is that source memory ques-
tions were asked in a naturalistic conversational context by a ‘second party’ interlocutor rather
than in a test situation by a ‘third party’ experimenter. This might have biased children to want
to manage conversational risk in their answers. If that was the case, it would further support the
idea that children of this age can recognize how source report modulates speaker commitment.
Alternatively, a response bias might have been caused by the fact that many of the children’s
beliefs do in fact come from testimony. Children might therefore have reported having been told
whenever they were unsure about their actual source because they have a baseline assumption
that any given piece of knowledge they have is likely to come from others.
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Conclusion
The current study suggests that by four years of age, children’s source memory retrieval is sen-
sitive to communicative context. This sensitivity likely forms the basis of an understanding of
the costs and benefits of source report for the purposes of hedging one’s bets or claiming
authority. Future studies should thus aim to disentangle whether children of this age group are
already sensitive to the communicative costs and benefits of different source reports.
In addition, we also found that, in contrast to earlier studies, children performed better at
reporting their source when their belief was based on testimony than when it was based on
perception. This effect might have been due to a bias on the children’s part to over-report testi-
mony as the source of their belief. Such a bias could be explained either by children’s attempt
to manage conversational risk or by a baseline assumption about the origins of their knowl-
edge in social sources.
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18. Sperber D., Clemént F., Heintz C., Mascaro O., Mercier H., Origgi G., et al. (2010). Epistemic Vigilance.
Mind & Language, 25(4), 359–393.
19. Giles J.W., Gopnik A. & Heyman G.D. (2002). Source monitoring reduces the suggestibility of preschool
children. Psychological Science, 13(3), 288–291. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9280.00453 PMID:
12009053
20. Robinson E. J., Haigh S. N., & Nurmsoo E. (2008). Children’s working understanding of knowledge
sources: Confidence in knowledge gained from testimony. Cognitive Development, 23(1), 105–118.
21. Whitcombe E. L. & Robinson E.J. (2000). Children’s decisions about what to believe and their ability to
report the source of their belief. Cognitive Development, 15, 329–346
22. Robinson E. J., & Whitcombe E. L. (2003). Children’s suggestibility in relation to their understanding
about sources of knowledge. Child Development, 74(1), 48–62. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8624.t01-
1-00520 PMID: 12625435
23. Mascaro O. & Sperber D. (2009). The moral, epistemic, and mindreading components of children’s vigi-
lance towards deception. Cognition, 112, 367–380. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2009.05.012
PMID: 19540473
24. Koenig M. A., & Harris P. L. (2005). Preschoolers mistrust ignorant and inaccurate speakers. Child
Development, 76(6), 1261–1277. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.2005.00849.x PMID:
16274439
PLOS ONE Disagreement affects children’s source memory performance
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0249958 April 9, 2021 16 / 18
25. Koenig M. A., Clément F., & Harris P. L. (2004). Trust in testimony: children’s use of true and false state-
ments. Psychological Science, 15(10), 694–698. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0956-7976.2004.00742.x
PMID: 15447641
26. Harris P., Koenig M. A., Corriveau K. H., & Jaswal V. K. (2018). Cognitive foundations of learning from
testimony. Annual Review of Psychology, 69(1), 1–1.23. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-
122216-011710 PMID: 28793811
27. Stephens E., Suarez S., & Koenig M. (2015). Early Testimonial Learning: Monitoring Speech Acts and
Speakers. In Benson J. B. (Ed.), Advances in Child Development and Behavior (Vol. 48, pp. 151–183).
JAI. https://doi.org/10.1016/bs.acdb.2014.11.004 PMID: 25735944
28. Dautriche I., Goupil L., Smith K., Rabagliati H. (in press). Knowing how you know: Toddlers re-evaluate
words learnt from an unreliable speaker. Open Mind. https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/ruwdk
29. Luchkina E., Corriveau K. H., & Sobel D. M. (2020). I don’t believe what you said before: Preschoolers
retrospectively discount information from inaccurate speakers. Journal of experimental child psychol-
ogy, 189, 104701. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2019.104701 PMID: 31604577
30. Scofield J., & Behrend D. A. (2008). Learning words from reliable and unreliable speakers. Cognitive
Development, 23(2), 278–290.
31. Mahr J. & Csibra G. (2018). Why do we remember? The communicative function of episodic memory.
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 41. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X17001297 PMID: 29353569
32. Altay S., Claidière N., & Mercier H. (2020). It happened to a friend of a friend: inaccurate source report-
ing in rumour diffusion. Evolutionary Human Sciences, 2.
33. Mahr J. B., & Csibra G. (2020, December 1). The effect of source claims on statement believability and
speaker accountability. https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/xjygq
34. Silver I., & Shaw A. (2018). No harm, still foul: Concerns about reputation drive dislike of harmless pla-
giarizers. Cognitive Science, 42, 213–240. https://doi.org/10.1111/cogs.12500 PMID: 28474738
35. Shaw A., & Olson K. (2015). Whose idea is it anyway? The importance of reputation in acknowledge-
ment. Developmental Science, 18(3), 502–509. https://doi.org/10.1111/desc.12234 PMID: 25227735
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